Where the Harm Comes From: Ethics of Mediating Collectives by de Lastic, Adélaïde et al.
Brolly. Journal of Social Sciences 2 (2) 2019 
7 
WHERE THE HARM COMES FROM:  
ETHICS OF MEDIATING COLLECTIVES 
 
Adélaïde de Lastic 
Institut Jean Nicod  
Paris, France 
adelaidedelastic@gmail.com 
 
Fanny Verrax 
Senter for Vitenskapsteori 
Univ. Bergen, Norway 
fanny.verrax@gmail.com 
 
Michel Puech 
Sorbonne Université 
Paris, France 
michel.puech@sorbonne-universite.fr 
 
 
Abstract. This article defines the intermediate level between personal agency and 
global issues of injustice as a complex system of mediating collectives, the agency of 
which must be addressed specifically in organizational and ontological but also in 
ethical and political terms. We target three domains of global injustice: economic, 
environmental, and gender-related, following the threads of briefly stated cases in 
these domains. Our conclusion suggests recommendations for dealing more 
realistically and more efficiently with global injustice that obstinately thrives from 
somewhere deep into the structures of the contemporary world. Our 
recommendations will bear on (a) individual responsibility in a collective, (b) 
virtuous direct and indirect action, (c) awareness of and communication with 
interdependent collectives, (d) optimal communication within every collective, (e) 
readiness for joint-action as an authentic group-agent. 
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1. QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
 
This article stems from the collaborative intersection of diverse 
research fields: A. de Lastic works on collective agency and the 
philosophy of the firm as a collective agent, F. Verrax teaches and 
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publishes on sustainability, engineering ethics, global injustice 
(environmental, economic), and new medias, and M. Puech 
investigates contemporary value systems (technology, sustainability, 
ordinary wisdom). We suppose the reader to be unfamiliar with at 
least some of the disciplinary fields we are referring to, therefore we 
briefly remind basic definitions and contexts for each of them. 
Our topic is global structural injustice construed in terms of 
wealth inequalities, environmental degradation and basic human 
rights violations. We proceed from the hypothesis that this question 
is a moral one because these wrongful facts and actions qualify as 
morally bad, evil, but we use the more neutral notion of harm in order 
to avoid religious prejudices and even a theory of natural evil that 
would impair our pragmatically oriented approach. We adopt an 
open-minded framework of virtue ethics (Besser and Slote 2015; 
Sandler and Cafaro 2005) to tackle this harm and to formulate 
applied ethics recommendations for midsize collectives. Our path 
will be marked out by a series of transverse real-world cases of global 
injustice: (a) the 1% vs the 99% in the distribution of world’s wealth 
(Stiglitz 2012), (b) climate change and its wrongful outcomes on the 
poor and on the global ecosystem (Martínez Alier 2003; Jamieson 
2014), (c) femicide: the intentional killing of female humans, directly 
or indirectly, even before birth, only because they are females 
(Radford and Russell 1992; Dayan 2018; Weil, Corradi, and Naudi 
2018). 
There certainly is global structural harm beyond economy, 
environment, and human rights, but we believe we are yet taking 
into account a representative share of what goes wrong in the non-
ideal world. 
Whose agency lies behind the global harm? Let us consider two 
of its main dimensions, the global structural economic injustice and 
the global structural ecosystems devastation. From a moral point of 
view, this harm would indeed deserve to be called "evil", and not 
only sad, regrettable, unacceptable, etc., because it is human-made 
and it remains modifiable by humans: we are in the moral domain. 
Theories of conspiracy come to quick conclusions by incriminating 
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a hidden malevolent collective human agency and thus reviving in 
different versions the age-old symbolism of the scapegoat. Handy 
scapegoats are easily found, from sorcerers and unbelievers to males 
and capitalists, extremists and terrorists. One of the numerous 
weaknesses of any conspiracy theory is that it relies on a theory of 
personal evil agency that fits perfectly with the Abrahamic religious 
notion of "sin" but not with the contemporary ethics of collective 
agency. If there is something rotten in the Kingdom, it must come 
from a finite number of individuals who can be identified and 
eradicated, so they say. But if the global harm is not due to the actions 
of an assignable number of persons, it is a conspiracy with no 
conspirator, and this drives us right back into the notion we are 
examining in this article: an undefined global agency which by no 
means is the common secret plan of some wicked individuals.  
This article defines a mediating level between personal agency 
and global issues in order to avoid two easy but objectionable 
explanations for global injustice: neither personal agency, which would 
justify intense moral pressure put on human persons, nor global 
agency, which leads to devising "just” global institutions or to 
debunking global conspiracies. Our proposal is to focus on an 
intermediate and inter-mediating level of largely unstructured 
collectives, myriads of them, constituting a collective agency that 
prospers as evil always does: remaining unnoticed, even to the 
perpetrators themselves. We have in mind a variety of contexts: 
what happens, or does not happen, in family circles, cohabitants or 
domestic communities of any kind, neighbourhood, local 
associations (civic, cultural, religious, jogging or swimming 
partners), small business units and mid-level management teams, 
etc., what is discussed and shared and what is not, how collective 
decisions are made and how personal decisions (buying a new 
phone, eating organic, refusing to move the office to another part 
of the town, confronting the new slightly macho employee, etc.) are 
influenced by and influence (more important!) other personal and 
group actions. In the most optimistic view of active intermediating 
collectives, the local political and administrative institutions, where 
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they function to accomplish their duty and not to mainly sustain 
themselves, can be generously counted in.  
 
 
2. INJUSTICE: GLOBAL, STRUCTURAL, AND BAD 
 
Let us recognize and characterize global harm through a certain 
number of facts and thereby define what we will take as global 
injustice whilst searching also a common structural cause behind the 
diversity of its instantiations.  
 
a) Global Economic Injustice 
It has become rather mundane to talk about economic injustice. 
What we mean by global economic injustice has been measured in 
various ways, the most convincing one probably being the 99%/1% 
ratio: the richest 1% owns more wealth than the whole of the rest 
of humanity (Crédit Suisse 2017). 
We assimilate extreme poverty with global injustice in two ways: 
first, extreme poverty does not allow people and communities to 
fulfil their basic needs nor human rights. Following the seminal 
work by Amartya Sen, we can also argue that extreme poverty does 
not allow for equal capabilities, hence for individuals’ opportunity 
to fulfilment (Sen 2009). This stand is rather consensual among 
philosophers, including utilitarians. Second, we believe that extreme 
economic inequalities are bad per se and, in this perspective, we do 
not agree with a utilitarian view that considers it harmless, if not 
positive, to increase the wealth of the richest while the poorest 
remain as poor.  
Many economists and policymakers believe however that this 
situation is morally acceptable insofar as it is continuously getting 
better. Without entering the necessarily technical debate, we can at 
least acknowledge the existing controversies among economists - 
for instance, Crédit Suisse estimated that 82% of all growth in global 
wealth in 2017 went to the top 1%, while the bottom half of 
humanity saw no increase at all (Crédit Suisse 2017, 10).. As 
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philosophers, we wonder whether the fact that some indicators may 
show a betterment of one aspect in an otherwise deeply iniquitous 
situation makes it more morally acceptable. At the very least, it 
seems to us that we can assess the phenomenon of irreducible 
extreme poverty as a piece of significant evidence for the existence 
of apparently irreducible harm in the contemporary non-ideal world. 
 
b) Environmental Injustice 
If climate change, as well as resources depletion and biodiversity 
loss, are global phenomena that are and will be affecting everyone 
on Earth, we follow the analysis by Martínez-Alier (2003) and 
others, who argue that the poorest humans, both at the individual 
and collective level, are the most vulnerable to climate change and 
to other environmental degradations. In this perspective, climate 
change appears to bring about a twofold global injustice: those who 
have the least will lose the most; those who are the most responsible 
(individually and collectively) will be impacted the least. This is a 
paradigmatic global structural injustice. 
 
Concretely, this injustice arises: 
- At the national level: The three most affected countries by 
extreme weather events between 1994 and 2013 were Honduras, 
Myanmar and Haiti. Of the ten most affected countries by 
climate change in the period 1994–2013, nine were developing 
countries in the low income or lower-middle-income country 
group (Kreft et al. 2014). 
- Within the same country, between the haves and the have-nots: 
the very likely price increase in electricity and basic commodities, 
including food, without even mentioning the issue of 
environmental taxation, will affect in priority the poorest. 
- Between men and women: Women being, still, mostly in charge 
with house chores such as gathering firewood or water in many 
parts of the world, the increasing scarcity of such resources will 
impose an uneven burden on men and women. 
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- Between humans and non-humans: the unprecedented loss of 
biodiversity, in terms of both number of species and of 
organisms, the so-called “sixth extinction,” (Barnosky et al. 2011; 
Leakey and Lewin 1996) has been proven a direct result of 
human activity.  
 
c) Gender Injustice 
Even though there are many different indicators of gender-based 
injustice (unequal access to education worldwide, unequal pay, 
unequal share of household chores, percentage of women being 
victims of rape and prostitution, etc.) we have decided to focus on 
the phenomenon of femicide as a particularly tragic proxy for 
gender-based injustice and as an indisputable case of moral harm. 
We take the definition of “femicide” coined by Radford and Russell 
(1992): “situations in which women are permitted to die as a result 
of misogynous attitude or social practices.” (Weil et al. 2018, 80) A 
more provocative, yet insightful definition, by the same authors, 
suggests that “Femicide is the killing of women qua women, often 
condoned by, if not sponsored, by the state and/or by religious 
institutions” (Radford and Russell 1192, 1). 
 
Concretely, femicide covers two distinct phenomena: 
- The killing of women by men: 87 000 women were killed 
intentionally in 2017. 58% of these homicides were perpetrated 
by their male partners, ex-partners or family members 
(sometimes female), including dowry quarrels or so-called 
“crimes of honour” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
2018). Another statistic reflects the gender imbalance of 
domestic violence: of all the persons who were killed by their 
domestic partner in 2017, 82% were women. Outside domestic 
violence, some have argued that the killing of women in the 
context of sexual violence, typically after a rape, can also be called 
a femicide or feminicide (Jablonka 2016). Finally, there is a rich 
documentation of femicides within very diverse geographical and 
cultural contexts: in San Juarez, Mexico, close to the American 
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border, hundreds of young indigenous women are killed - they 
are referred to as “las inditas del sur” (Gaspar de Alba and 
Guzmán 2014).  
- Sex-selective abortion: Gender-based abortion, the practice of 
killing female fetuses, because a family prefers to welcome a baby 
boy, is most common in Africa and Asia, where there has been 
an estimation of 100 million women “missing”, according to a 
well-known article by Amartya Sen (1990). In India, the program 
“Beti Bachao, Beti Padao” (Save the Girl, Educate the Girl) was 
launched in 2015 as an attempt to address this issue, but with 
little results so far.  
 
Altogether, these factual harms raise the question: who is 
responsible? The couple who decides to get an abortion, hoping for 
a boy next time? The family that may be encouraging them as a way 
to save the dowry’s money? The community that endorses 
unreasonable dowry’s customs and more generally the unjust 
treatment of women? The government who shows little dedication 
in efficiently tackling the issue? The local authorities who officially 
enforce the law but in the field deals with persistent traditions, 
corruption and even threats? We suggest: the intricate and systemic 
whole, in which levels can be defined and addressed in a typically 
non-global and non-ideal manner (individuals according to their 
gender, families, local communities, authorities level by level, etc.). 
Finally, it is noteworthy that these three types of injustice are not 
separated but can stack: in this perspective, being a poor woman 
living in a country that is particularly vulnerable to climate change is 
being prone to a triple injustice and triple harm. Should being a 
relatively well-off male and/or living in a country where climate 
change is lenient count as a passive evil agency of a new sort? This is 
the kind of absurd shortcut that we want to prevent in drawing 
attention to intermediate collectives and their non-neutral agency. 
An inconvenient basic fact concerning global injustice raises the 
stakes: it is still there to stay as a global structure, in spite of resisting 
intellectual, institutional and personal endeavours to mitigate, 
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compensate or by any means get rid of it. Global economic injustice 
(a) is described by Stiglitz as endangering our future (Stiglitz 2012) 
in an atmosphere of discontents after decades of unfulfilled 
promises (W.T.O., I.FM. and U.N.’s agencies) (Stiglitz 2002). 
Environmental crisis in general (b) features in “serious fictions” like 
Oreskes and Conway’s (Oreskes and Conway 2014) as the coming 
inevitable collapse of our civilization and it leads well-intended 
philosophers like Jamieson (2014) to evoking a “dark time” due to 
the failure of human reason and institutions. Gender injustice (c) 
fares as badly as the other human rights, even worse perhaps 
because the issue is denied as being already solved in “enlightened” 
countries and as being a non-issue in the rest of the world.  
Watching how campaigns to raise consciousness and institutions 
devised to bring justice are often rapidly neutralized, countered or 
in the worst case massively counter-productive, one is reminded of 
Ivan Illich’s theory of counter-productive institutions (let us recall 
how broad his vision of injustice was, which included for instance 
“shadow work”, prefiguring women or undocumented immigrants 
abuses), reinforced by recent critiques of our obsession with 
bureaucracy (Graeber 2015).  
Neither global institutions nor virtue preaching discourses seems 
to work quick enough or efficiently enough. We even suspect a 
systemic counter-productivity of patronizing institutions and of the 
guilt-ridden individuals they produce - while inducing in the other 
individuals the typical self-satisfactory feeling that all these 
complicated bad affairs are delegated to the good (institutional) 
hands.  
A reasonable answer to the question “why can’t we fix it?” could 
be: because we still don’t understand what is broken, what doesn’t 
work as it should. Hence, the efforts of people, governments, 
lobbies of any kind to set up largely useless institutional initiatives. 
Is there some sort of category mistake (an ontological 
misunderstanding that sabotages action from the inside) in the 
efforts to identify the source of global structural injustice as an evil 
collective agency? According to the two main interpretations of 
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agency, this harmful agency is situated in individuals (and then it 
should be treated by voluntary or forced personal moralization) or 
in a group agency, a conspiracy (and then it should be treated by the 
force of law, national and supranational). The practical results of 
both these approaches are currently considered disheartening and 
this is the stimulus to step back to an initial category mistake. But it 
might not be the notion of group-agency or collective agency in 
itself, rather the oversimplified qualification of this agency as "bad" 
in the perspective of a punitive backwards-looking responsibility. 
Let us take global structural issues as due to a cloud of collective 
interacting agencies, and consider this system in a constructive 
outlook of forward-looking responsibility. The focus remains on the 
agency, but neither the traditional personal one nor a global group-
agent. 
 
 
3. COLLECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS 
 
The existing, emerging and future kinds of collectives, some of them 
organizations in the traditional sense and the others networks in 
many innovative ways, can be subjects of a global ethics based on 
virtue ethics in its currently burgeoning varieties (Sandler 2007, 
chap. 5.). Building upwards from personal ethics and towards justice 
can be done with a program (Slote 2007) of care, empathy, and 
moral virtues (revisited). The decisive step in our view is to identify 
the intermediating collectives, whatever their organizational nature, 
and to suggest for them specific virtues. 
The three transverse themes as we are following them originating 
from a more global entity that cannot simply be taken as a group-
agent. They come from a systemic entity comprising culture, social 
values, incumbent economic structures, existing political systems. 
The transverse question, it appears, ought then to be: how are the 
new kinds of intermediating agency actually mingling with these 
systemic issues and from there on how can they rearrange the whole 
systemic mess with some likelihood to improve it? 
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A little bit of ontology is required here to clarify the nature and 
identity of a group-agent. From the vast and controversial literature 
on the subject, a consensus emerges: collective organizations like 
enterprises (business firms), governments, NGOs, and so many 
other forms are things and, more precisely, they are “social objects” 
that can be seen like “corporate agents”. These organizations 
essentially act in the world. Amazon launches delivery by drones, 
Greenpeace saves whales, the Spanish government allows a vote for 
the independence of a province. But in these expressions do we 
mean that Greenpeace actually acts as a group-agent, as a whole? Or 
do we use this image but we actually mean that some individuals, 
some parts or members of Greenpeace once save whales? Does the 
group embody a specific identity or does it just possess the 
cumulative identity of its parts? The answer to this question justifies 
understanding the behaviour of firms and national states as 
"corporate agents." This is still a moot point in legal and 
philosophical theories. 
Two main options are explored. 
(1) The individual or a definite part takes precedence over the whole. This 
prevailing of the individual over the collective entity is known as 
"methodological individualism" in the sociological tradition. It is a 
paradigm of social sciences according to which collective 
phenomena can (and must) be described and explained from the 
properties and actions of individuals and their mutual interactions 
(bottom-up approach). Coleman dubbed these groups "multi-
agents" systems. This interpretation leads to the tenet that any 
decision or action of the collective reflects (more or less clearly) the 
overall decisions and actions of individuals (Coleman 1990).  
Thus considered, the group can always be reduced to its parts. 
Peter French affirms that the intentions of the company are always 
reducible to human intentions (French 1979). From an ethical point 
of view, this position suggests that collective responsibility can be 
reduced to individual responsibility. This position amounts to 
consider that there is no responsibility of the group as such; this is 
only a manner of speaking. 
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(2) It exists a singular identity of the group. This second position 
considers that there is a singular identity of the group, which is a 
reality distinct from the individuals making up the group. This 
position leads to recognizing that group-agent responsibility and 
individual responsibilities are distinct. 
We are more sympathetic to this second option, which gives a 
singular and autonomous place to the existence, responsibility, and 
agency of diverse levels of collectives and basically opens the 
question: which collective to deal with which issue?  
To go further, after assuming the singular existence of a group 
or an organization we need to fully understand it as a social object, 
namely an object that is not defined only by its physical instantiation 
but also by a collective intention, that is to say by the projections the 
agents make on it. The social object, like a firm or a bank note, is a 
whole composed of physical and mental elements. Without 
collective intentions, the firm is just a building and the bank note 
just a paper sheet. But social objects like firms, governments, 
hospitals, schools and so on have something essential in common: 
their principal intrinsic property is constituted by individuals. The 
unity and independence of the collective intention and collective 
agency make sense out of this intrinsic property, under complex 
conditions that we need to put forward now. 
There are four conditions to qualify a group, whereas the 
intention is common to all its members: a shared goal, individual 
contributions to achieve the goal, interdependence (each one 
formulates one’s intentions partly because they believe that others 
share these intentions), and common consciousness. The common 
intention allows joint action. But how can a multi-member group 
evolve from a multiplicity of dispositions (or "attitudes") to a unique 
goal approved by all the group members? To answer this question, 
List and Pettit introduce the concept of "aggregative function", 
which is a vector starting from individual dispositions towards the 
emergence of an autonomous group aim (List and Pettit 2011). The 
joint commitments required for the emergence of the group is easy 
to be described, according to Margaret Gilbert: “How are joint 
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commitments formed? To put it very generally, in a situation where 
there are no special background understandings, each person must 
express to the others that he is in a certain broadly speaking mental 
state, such that common knowledge among them that all have made, 
the appropriate expressions suffices to create a joint commitment 
of them all. I refer to this state as “readiness” for joint commitment. 
As to common knowledge, suffice it to say that the expressions in 
question must be “out in the open” as far as the parties-to-be are 
concerned." (Gilbert 2015, 80).  
The autonomous group aims and the resulting joint commitment 
are the base of collective agency. Furthermore, an organization can 
access superior agentive properties that are: having representational 
states of the environment, building a motivational state that 
specifies the things needed by the environment, being able to rely 
on these two previous "intentional" states to intervene properly in 
the environment (List and Pettit 2011).  
The reality of the group-agent, based on the intrinsic conditions 
of agency and on the possibility of a single group’s aim cannot be 
cogently contested. Therefore, the entity as group-agent can be 
subject to criticism, accusation etc. For example, when BP is held 
responsible for an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, it is considered as 
an agent that can be prosecuted as such. This position does not 
prevent recognizing individual responsibilities. Each member of the 
group is in a sense individually morally responsible for the outcome 
of the joint action but each is individually responsible jointly with 
the others (Miller and Makela 2005, 234). There is no paradox in 
group agency but the superposition of collective and individual 
responsibility. They are linked but they are different. From this 
perspective, the individual agent, belonging to numerous formal and 
informal collectives, carries a multiply folded responsibility and 
agency. It is not advisable to manage this kind of complex 
interdependence with a mechanical engineering logic, typical 
Western-style rationalizing. It is worth trying to implement in one’s 
mind a Daoist, Buddhist or ecological sense of harmony in systemic 
interdependence (Hershock 2012, 2006; Naess 1989) 
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There is another form of the collective agent: the networks and 
new collectives (especially political collectives). For example, a 
consumer’s or a brand community, the “Yellow Vests” movement 
in France (2018-2019), the Anonymous on the Internet, a local 
collective for welcoming refugees, etc. Since the 2000s, this kind of 
collective is more and more important in public life and in the 
media, it gathers all types of population and gains public support up 
to the point of becoming the only remaining collective deserving 
trust, confronted to companies, state governments or other “stable” 
major institutions. A comprehensive study of this new logic in social 
movements is due to Manuel Castells (Castells 2012) and the 
phenomenon as a whole, supported by the Internet, Facebook, and 
other iconic medias of the 21st century, is a literal deployment of 
what was announced as the “wisdom of crowds” (Surowiecki 2004) 
or “organizing without organizations” (Shirky 2008). These groups 
possess the same nature, identity, and type of collective agency than 
the standard group-agents mentioned before, in the sense that they 
have a real group identity and an autonomous collective agency, 
most of the times a very visible and communicative one. But their 
operational inner working is not the same and that makes a real 
difference for the global collective injustice issue. 
These types of collectives are informal. For them, the individual 
is as important as the whole, and they have a network organization. 
Some midsize organizations or even informal networks inside large 
organizations can have the same characteristics – and so they can be 
mediating collectives for global change, from the inside of large 
existing structures. We propose this Table for identifying the main 
differences: 
 
 
Group agents: firms, governments, 
NGOs 
New collectives and some 
midsize informal organizations 
Formal Informal 
Vertical/Pyramidal  Horizontal organization 
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The whole is more important The individual is as important as 
the group 
Contractual adhesion Adhesion by acting 
Orderly constitution Viral constitution 
Top-down  Bottom-up  
Process Emergence 
 
The value of these new collectives is based on the non-dissolution 
of the person in the group, and this comes from: 1) Actions. 
Participation in the group is only made by individual voluntary acts 
and not by formal, contractual, or theoretical adhesion; 2) The fact 
that they are uncontrollable. These types of collectives are very 
difficult to be controlled by other organizations because they are 
elusive. There is no one or no whole to seize. The movement 
emerges from below and it is not governed by a board. To 
deconstruct it, it is not possible to remove the head of the group, it 
is necessary to treat each individuality, one by one. This is obviously 
complicated especially when the collective is very widespread; 
Precisely, 3) thanks to the previously mentioned features and thanks 
to the Internet, the new collectives can grow at a very high speed, 
they can spread very quickly: it is "viral." 
Finally, new collectives appear as very powerful in a time of 
public inertness and they are sometimes the only remaining option 
for solving social problems. The governance of the common 
resources could, according to Ostrom, be assured by voluntary 
organizations, by collectives able to take charge of the common 
goods in a mature collaborative way: 
 
“Success in starting small-scale initial institutions enables a group of 
individuals to build on the social capital thus created to solve larger problems 
with larger and more complex institutional arrangements. Current theories of 
collective action do not stress the process of accretion of institutional capital. 
Thus, one problem in using them as foundations for policy analysis is that 
they do not focus on the incremental self-transformations that frequently are 
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involved in the process of supplying institutions. Learning is an incremental, 
self-transforming process.” (Ostrom 2011, 190). 
 
Defending the commons depends on companies and institutions as 
group-agents but also on individuals belonging to these groups and, 
maybe, we can hope for more efficiency from there than from 
classical organizations. In this process, learning is central, as stressed 
by Ostrom. For the agent-groups this learning amounts to a duty to 
know, legally called "duty of vigilance". Its correspondence to the 
virtue of awareness is obvious. 
For addressing problems as big and systemic as inequality, 
climate change and femicide, we have to consider organizations and 
new collectives in their possible counter-productive outcomes, as 
well as in their potential game-changer action. To begin with, a 
robust theory of personal bonds in informal collectives can be 
drawn from the famous article on the strength of weak ties by 
Granovetter (Granovetter 1973). We are advocating here for the 
strength of weak-ties collectives and affirming they are an 
indispensable mediation agency for global issues (they address the 
global bottom-up from individual ethics). The weakness and 
dangers of informal collectives, large mobs or small occasional 
crowds, is a well-attested phenomenon in history as in personal 
experience, but the new kind of collectives in the 21st century is 
aware of that and consciously insists on the need to subvert the 
traditional model of a governance by the “knowing few.” 
How can the agency of a collective, even an informal one, take 
over individual responsibility or, better, transpose it to a higher 
level? We have argued that an organization is a full-agent in its own 
right, that it can be held responsible for its actions because it has all 
the characteristics of agency: 1) It has a normative capacity that 
allows significant normative choices involving the possibility of 
doing something good or bad, correct or false. 2) It has a judgmental 
capacity. 3) It is able to organize itself for acting according to 
pursued collective desires and it is able to choose between several 
proposals. A collective agent is able to self-regulate. 
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The term "legal person" states that a corporation or a group may 
be considered responsible as a person would, a fictitious or artificial 
person, but nevertheless a person, able to assume responsibility, and 
who has duties and rights. However, it is one thing to posit the legal 
existence of the legal person from a performative point of view, in 
the restricted arena of jurisdiction; it is another to imagine this 
personification as intrinsic, considering that the person must have a 
material consistency. But we have previously recognized that the 
agent-group may perform judgments and moral acts, it may enter 
into engagements with other agents, and it may be a source or target 
of requests. It acts, then it is. 
In terms of nature and degrees of responsibility, there is then no 
difference between a “classical organization” and new collectives: 
they have the same duty to assume their responsibility. 
For an organization, responsibility is multiple. If we talk about 
corporate responsibility, we talk about the responsibility of the 
group, therefore collective responsibility. The organization's 
responsibility is named “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) and 
it contains responsibility for the stakeholders affected by its actions. 
To better understand the limits of its responsibility and how it is 
distributed, let us analyse its stakeholders. Global issues, after all, are 
nothing but unlimited stakeholders issues. 
Against Milton Friedman, well known for defending the idea that 
the sole responsibility of the company is to maximize its profit and 
consequently the benefit for its shareholders (Friedman 1970), more 
and more people and organizations now consider that companies 
have to compensate their outsourced costs for the community 
(pollution, accidents, unemployment...) (Carroll 1979, 500). It is now 
admitted that a company has to assume its social and environmental 
impact. In theory, we should be in a fairer world. 
But applying this theory meets some difficulties. How is the 
responsibility chain organized within a group-agent? To answer this 
question, we have to differentiate between the “classical 
organization” and these new collectives. They have the same duty 
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towards society and the environment, but not the same organization 
for implementing it. 
(1) When the organization is constituted like a firm, a hospital, a 
school, it is rather easy to attribute its responsibility as a group 
because the entity is well identified. It can be governed as an 
autonomous entity. In case of a problem, there is a person, a legal 
person to bring legal action against. It is always possible to ask for a 
report on wage levels, carbon impact, gender equality and so on. 
But in the case of other organizations, below the radar of 
business, social or environmental law, it could be complicated to 
attribute individual responsibility. In fact, the level of responsibility 
of members in relation to the group is not the same depending on 
whether they work for the group or they otherwise participate in the 
achievement of the group's objectives - and depending on their 
precise level of participation. The problem happens when a task is 
divided between too many people because this prevents people 
from seeing the purpose of the task, including its moral purpose. In 
this way, it can be said that there is a significant risk of dilution of 
individual responsibility. And this is a preoccupying ethical flaw in 
an organization. 
This issue of collective responsibility and group agent has been 
addressed by social psychology in a seminal work (Latané and 
Darley 1970) that analyses the phenomenon of dilution of 
responsibility as playing a key part in collective agency’s fault. 
Following several sensational stories from the 1960s and 1970s in 
which victims of rape and/or murder were not helped, nor the 
police called, despite the presence of numerous witnesses, the 
concept of dilution of responsibility emerged, consisting of three 
components: 
Social influence: what are the others doing? Peer pressure here 
means that in a situation of potential danger, an individual first 
spends some time observing the action, or inaction, of others. This 
behaviour tends to result in strong inertia: if nobody is doing 
anything, perhaps it is not that serious. 
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- Evaluation apprehension: what if I’m wrong in my perception or 
interpretation of the situation? Following the first aspect, this 
propensity enhances the need for making situations of injustice 
as clear and explicit as possible, and it explains why modern evil 
prospers in ambiguity. 
- Diffusion of responsibility: why should I do something if nobody else does? It 
is noteworthy that this type of reasoning seldom plays a role 
when one is confronted with actions affecting one’s own well-
being - apart perhaps in early childhood. Thus, a smoker may 
invoke many reasons why he is not quitting (it is not a good time 
right now, I don’t smoke that much, etc.) but it would be highly 
unusual to hear: “others are smoking as much, or even more than 
I do.” Yet this is exactly the type of reasoning commonly used to 
justify a lack of concern or action regarding global injustice. 
 
(2) When the organization is a network or non-formalized midsize 
organization, it is more complicated to hold it responsible. We can 
hold it symbolically responsible but not legally: we have no hold. 
For example, when the Occupy Wall Street movement acts, it is 
almost impossible to prevent them, even though individuals can be 
arrested on the spot or afterwards and prosecuted as responsible.  
On the other hand, each member of this kind of group assumes 
its responsibility. We have seen that in the new kind of networks 
individuals are as important as the whole. This is the key factor. 
They, individuals, belong to the group by their acts. This is the 
rampart against the dilution of responsibility. This is why people 
being judged and imprisoned is very important in this kind of 
collective. The judgment is personalized because precisely individual 
responsibility takes precedence over collective responsibility. 
Ironically, then, the existence of formal organizations, deserving 
the status of “moral persons” and the emergence of all sorts of 
informal and coalescent collectives do not wipe off individual 
agency but, on the contrary, they give birth to new forms of 
individual engagement in collective agency, particularly the inter-
mediating ones we are focusing on. 
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4. ETHICS OF INTERMEDIATE COLLECTIVES 
 
There is a partially transitive agency through multi-layered inter-
mediating collectives, whose ethics is still weak, blurred, bloated, or 
non-existent. An ethics of intermediate collectives suggests a 
number of reasons for explaining the disappointing bad results of 
our best efforts against injustice. 
When the organization is conceived and shaped for maintaining personal 
unawareness instead of raising personal awareness, its mediation 
between personal moral sense or values and the practical outcomes 
of the activity is a built-in feature of this organization. In some cases 
(slaughterhouse or the entire sector of industrial food), is there any 
reason to believe that this organized unawareness is not intentional? 
Since the most ancient empires on Earth, it seems, pyramidal 
organization is an excellent framework for personal unawareness 
and irresponsibility. “I was just obeying orders” is a frequent 
argument when war atrocities are prosecuted. The recent scandal 
dubbed “Dieselgate” in the automobile industry can be connected 
to the still “Taylorian” and patriarchal management style in this 
high-engineered commodity industry. No inter-mediating collective 
was able to blow the whistle, even though some of the guilty 
companies have been advertising for years their internal process for 
engineering ethics and transparency. 
The timescale issue, when short-term is everything and long-term 
has no weight, is terribly damaging, especially for climate change and 
global injustice. “In the long run we are all dead”, said one of the 
most humanist economists (Keynes) and everyone in politics know 
that the number one concern for politicians is the short-term of 
their re-election. 
Cognitive biases can be listed as five barriers blocking the climate 
message and many comparable subjects, the “5 Ds”: Distance, 
Doom, Dissonance, Denial, iDentity (Stoknes 2015). 
The crisis of institutions and classical organizations in the early 21st 
century gives a final touch: if no existing institution is acceptable as 
representing the collective agency of citizens while individual agency 
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is obviously at the wrong scale for global issues, the predicament is 
as ominous as can be. The classic organization was representative 
by definition in our liberal culture: a chosen leader decides and 
represents the individuals. Based on the social contract theories due 
to Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau, this type of organization begins with 
a deal, either explicitly or tacitly, between individuals and the group, 
where individuals voluntarily give up their own power of decision 
against a power of representation. This type of organization, 
pyramidal, vertical, is still the paradigm, not only in the official 
political organizations like governments but also in economic 
organizations like companies. Organizations representing 
individuals are the condition of possibility for an autonomous group 
identity that does not boil down to a simple aggregation of 
individuals. But when individuals believe that organizations no 
longer represent them, no common agency can make sense.  
In the moment of individual empowerment, supported by the 
Internet (Himanen 2001), the classical organization, which 
maintains personal unconsciousness and irresponsibility instead of 
raising awareness, is no longer adapted to the change in social 
values. But, at the same time, we need to identify group-agents 
because we need them to assume their social responsibility. How 
can we have both representative groups and responsible individuals?  
This question belongs to the formidable task of reinventing 
democracy. The ethic of mediating collectives resulting from this 
article leads to some suggestions. 
For personal responsibility, we suggest highlighting and 
assuming individualities in the group and the responsibility related to 
each of them. Individuals can question themselves, question the 
finality of their actions (is it good for me, for the group, for the 
environment?) and they assume the responsibility for it. 
For virtuous enduring action, we suggest to act daily, oneself or 
as a collective, directly or indirectly, avoiding gluttony, arrogance, 
greed, and apathy towards humans on the non-human environment, 
and consider these micro-actions as the wanted form of virtue (Sandler 
and Cafaro 2005; Puech 2016). 
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For external communication, one may implement in the routine 
process or habits of every intermediate collective an awareness and 
updating of all other significantly interdependent collectives (same level, higher 
level, lower level). 
For internal communication, what works according to our 
consultancy experience is a routine of horizontal discussions on 
applied ethical issues within relevant internal collectives, so that 
when a dilemma or delicate decision-making situation occurs, the 
space for discussion is already in place (Davis 2005). Better internal 
communication and a different storytelling (Stoknes 2015) can help 
to arrange this. 
For group-agency, we advise validating, by open and clear 
constant communication within the group, the “readiness” for one 
or several definite joint actions so that they are understood and felt as 
actions of the collective. 
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